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Junk Science, Test Validity, and the
Uniform Guidelines for Personnel
Selection Procedures: The Case
of Melendez v. Illinois Bell
Fred B. Bryant, Ph.D. and Elaine K.B. Siegel
Loyola University Chicago

Hager & Siegel, P.C.

This paper stems from a recent federal court case in which a standardized test of cognitive ability developed by AT&T, the Basic
Scholastic Aptitude Test (BSAT), was ruled invalid and discriminatory for use in hiring Latinos. Within the context of the BSAT,
we discuss spurious statistical arguments advanced by the defense,
exploiting certain language in the current Uniform Guidelines for
evaluating the fairness and validity of personnel selection tests.
These issues include: (a) how to avoid capitalizing on chance; (b)
what constitutes “a measure” of job performance; (c) how to judge
the meaningfulness of group differences in performance measures;
and (d) how to combine data from different sex, race, or ethnic
subgroups when computing validity coefficients for the pooled,
total sample. Pursuant to the Uniform Guidelines’ standard for unfairness, when one ethnic group scores higher on an employment
test, the test is deemed “unfair” if this difference is not reflected in
a measure of job performance. Although studies validating selection instruments often survive the unfairness test, such data are
vulnerable to bias and manipulation, if appropriate statistical procedures are not used. We consider both the benefits (greater clarity
and precision) and the potential costs (loss of legal precedent) of
revising the Uniform Guidelines to address these issues. We further discuss legal procedures to limit “junk science” in the courtroom, and the need to reevaluate validity generalization in light of
Simpson’s “false correlation” paradox.

The purpose of this paper is to share our
insights from a recent federal court case, which
we refer to as Melendez, involving a claim of

employment discrimination in personnel selection, Melendez v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, No. 90 C 5020 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1994),
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aff’d, 79 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 1996).1 These insights arise from certain defenses advanced by
the employer, in which dubious statistical procedures were justified by language from current
federal guidelines for validating personnel selection tests, the Uniform Guidelines for Employee Selection Procedures, promulgated jointly by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the United States Departments of Labor, Justice, and the Treasury
[43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (August 25, 1978); EEOC,
29 CFR Part 1607]. We refer to these as the
Uniform Guidelines.
After providing some background to the
particular legal case involved, we describe the
original validation studies that formed the heart
of the litigation, and present research evidence
which was the main point of contention at trial.
After summarizing the evidence against the validity of the personnel selection test in question—
the Basic Scholastic Aptitude Test (BSAT)—we
highlight some apparent ambiguities in the Uniform Guidelines. Comparable ambiguities exist
in both the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing2 and in the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology’s Principles
for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures.3 Ironically, although the Uniform Guidelines are intended to promote equality of employment opportunity regardless of
race, religion, and gender, they do not expressly
prohibit the use of certain research practices that
produce spurious artifacts, and which actually
perpetuate discrimination in the workplace.
In this paper we share our observations
with professionals within the psychological
testing, statistical analysis, human resources and
legal communities; discuss the application of
Uniform Guidelines in maintaining consistency
vis-à-vis professional standards; and conclude
by recommending a reevaluation of the procedure of validity generalization in light of Simpson’s “false correlation” paradox (i.e., paradoxical confounding).

Historical Context
What was this trial all about? Plaintiff
Carmelo Melendez claimed he was denied equal
employment opportunity in applying for a job
with defendant Illinois Bell Telephone Company. Mr. Melendez was born and raised in
Puerto Rico, and moved to East Chicago in the
middle of his grade school years. Though he
spoke no English, Mr. Melendez was placed in a
monolingual English classroom. A straight-A
student in Puerto Rico, in the United States he
got F’s. By struggling hard, he learned English,
taught himself the skills he needed to advance,
and raised his grades until, by the time he graduated from high school, he was earning B’s.
It was then, however, that Mr. Melendez
first encountered an obstacle that he could not
overcome, and that he would confront throughout his adult life: standardized ability tests. He
performed miserably on the SAT, and could not
attend college. He decided to apply for an
entry-level position in metallurgy at the local
steel mill. He failed the standardized entry
examination, however. Yet another standardized test kept him out of the military.
Mr. Melendez persevered, and eventually got his college degree. He also became a
certified x-ray technician, and he eventually
worked for the federal Civil Rights Commission. He went on to become the host of a Chicago-area television talkshow. Then, in 1988, he
applied for a job as Assistant Manager of Urban
Affairs for Illinois Bell.
The job description called for a person
who could interface with the local Latino community, to assess emerging urban trends for use
in marketing telecommunications services. The
successful applicant should be able to interact
with community leaders and residents, and to
communicate effectively in a bilingual setting,
orally and in writing.
Illinois Bell required all external applicants for its first-level management jobs to surmount three separate pass-fail hurdles. Applicants had to have a college diploma, graduating
177
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in the top half of the class. Applicants had to
pass a structured, standardized interview, demonstrating a sufficient level of leadership. Finally, applicants had to take the standardized
Basic Scholastic Aptitude Test (BSAT), scoring
at or above a raw pass-fail cutoff score of 196.
This cognitive ability test was the central focus
of the court case.
The BSAT is a standardized paper-andpencil test, purporting to assess verbal and quantitative ability, much like the SAT. It also includes questions designed to tap the ability to follow directions, in which one must indicate answers while listening to a tape-recording which
contains complex, conflicting instructions. Each
subsection of the test is timed, or “speeded,” and
the entire test takes about one hour.
Despite his college degree and his success on the leadership interview, Mr. Melendez
failed the BSAT. He grew depressed and despondent, and became estranged from his family
for more than a year. Not long after his rejecttion by Illinois Bell, however, Melendez won a
position with the federal government. He has
performed successfully there ever since, and has
risen to a position of authority.
Based on his experience, Mr. Melendez
believed that the BSAT was unfair because it
was not job-related. He saw no connection between the skills required to do well on the job of
Assistant Urban Affairs Manager, and the skills
required to pass the BSAT. To right the wrong,
he filed suit against Illinois Bell for employment
discrimination.

from the original AT&T validation report: in
1979, about 3 in 4 whites passed the test, versus
1 in 5 African-Americans, and 1 in 2 Latinos.4
Table 1: Rates of Success and Failure on the
BSAT for Different Racial Groups
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Racial Group
White
Black
Latino
------------ ------------ ----------Time Period
P
F
P
F
P
F
---------------- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----1979
n 265 79 42 151 25 29
% 77 23 22
78 47 53
1987-88 n 344 51
% 87 13

83
57

62
43

50
53

44
47

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Between-Group Pairwise Comparisons
via Fisher’s Exact Test
W79

W87

B79

B87

L79

W87 .000459
B79

.000001

.000001

B87

.000018

.000001

.000001

L79

.000010

.000001

.000827

.21

L87

.000014
.000001 .000001
.60
.50
---------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Pairwise comparisons were performed using twotailed Fisher’s exact test computed using ODA software. 5
Row and column headings indicate both ethnic class (W=
white, B=Black, L=Latino) and time period (79=1979,
87=1987-88). Tabled for each unique combination of row
and column is the p-value (six significant digits) for the
exact test comparing pass/fail rates of the corresponding
samples. P-values indicated in red are statistically significant at experimentwise p<0.05 based on an appropriate
Bonferroni criterion (see discussion in paper: p<.05/1115,
or p<0.000046); p-values indicated in blue are statistically
significant at the generalized criterion (per-comparison p<
0.05); p-values indicated in black are not significant.5

Adverse Impact of the BSAT
Before turning to the evidence concerning test validity, we first consider the BSAT’s
impact on applicants of different ethnicity (i.e.,
the BSAT pass-fail rates for different racial or
ethnic groups). Table 1 presents pass-fail rates
for whites, African-Americans and Latinos on
the BSAT separately for two time periods: 1979
and 1987-88. The 1979 statistics are for 591
managerial applicants, and are taken directly

The 1987-88 pass-fail statistics are from
Illinois Bell’s records, from a sample of 634
178
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applicants for first-level management positions.
During the 1987-88 period, most whites—nearly
9 in 10—passed the test, versus 6 in 10 AfricanAmericans and 5 in 10 Latinos.
To evaluate these pass-fail rates, there is
a guideline for judging the impact of an employment test on different ethnic groups. This ruleof-thumb is known as the “four-fifths rule.”
According to this guideline, a test has an adverse impact on an ethnic group whose pass rate is
less than four-fifths the rate of the group with
the highest test pass-rate: “A selection rate for
any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate
for the group with the highest rate will generally
be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a
greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be
regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as
evidence of adverse impact” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.4.D). The Uniform Guidelines define “adverse impact” as: “A substantially different rate of selection in hiring, promotion, or
other employment decision which works to the
disadvantage of members of a race, sex, or ethnic group” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.16.B).
In 1979, for example, whites had the
highest pass-rate on the BSAT, at 77% (see
Table 1). The BSAT, then, had an adverse impact on any group in 1979 whose BSAT passrate falls below four-fifths of 77% (or below
61.6%). The 1979 pass-rates for African-Americans (22%) and Latinos (47%) are clearly lower
than the four-fifths mark of 61.6%.
For the 1987-88 period, under the Uniform Guidelines’ four-fifths rule, the BSAT had
an adverse impact on any group whose pass-rate
falls below four-fifths of the white pass rate of
87% (or below 69.6%). Because pass rates for
African-Americans (57%) and Latinos (53%)
are below this four-fifths mark of 69.6%, the
BSAT had an adverse impact on both of these
groups during 1987-88, according to the Uniform Guidelines’ standard.

This evidence of strong and consistent
adverse impact makes test validity even more
vital. Rejecting such a large number of minority
applicants might be defensible, if the test accurately predicted important on-the-job performance. For example, imagine using a valid test of
visual acuity to select fighter-pilots; if minority
applicants have worse eyesight than majority
applicants, then so be it. It is an entirely different matter, however, if the test has nothing to do
with on-the-job performance. If minorities do
not actually have worse eyesight, then the test
unfairly denies them equal employment opportunity. In the case of the BSAT, the evidence
for test validity is particularly critical, given the
unequivocal adverse impact on minorities. In
the words of the Uniform Guidelines: “Reliance
upon a selection procedure which is significantly related to a criterion measure, but which
is based upon a study involving a large number
of subjects and has a low correlation coefficient
will be subject to close review if it has a large
adverse impact...” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.
14(B)(6).
BSAT Validation Studies
Two validation studies of the BSAT
formed the heart of the litigation, and the trial
gravitated around certain research evidence
from these studies. In the late 1970s, AT&T industrial/organizational psychologists developed
the BSAT, using test components originally
written by the Educational Testing Service
(ETS), which also developed the SAT, LSAT,
GRE, and other cognitive ability tests. One of
the AT&T psychologists drafted the final research report containing two validation studies,
which assessed the relationship between BSAT
scores and job performance. These studies purported to evaluate the BSAT’s predictive validity, i.e., its ability to predict subsequent on-thejob performance. Illinois Bell relied on these
validation studies in using the BSAT to screen
its job applicants.
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The first of the two validation studies,
referred to as the Preliminary Study, focused on
entry-level managers already hired at 8 different
company locations throughout the country. This
Preliminary Study included 229 managers who
had earlier taken a large battery of standardized
tests, including the School and College Ability
Test (SCAT) and the predecessor of the BSAT,
the Bell System Qualification Test (BSQT).
One year after these applicants were hired their
job performance was evaluated by their supervisors, who rated each applicant’s job performance using a set of 13 criterion measures,
developed through a job analysis of management positions, including ratings of skills in
planning, decision making, oral and written communications, leadership, resistance to stress,
interpersonal awareness, and a global rating of
overall job performance. The test developers
then selected a subset of verbal and math items
based on correlations with supervisor ratings,
and these items became the BSAT. Researchers
then examined the relationship between test
score and rating of overall job performance to
establish a pass-fail cut-score for the test, which
was implemented throughout AT&T companies.
The second validation study, referred to
as the Followup Study, focused on 286 job applicants who were applying for entry-level management positions in 11 different AT&T company locations. Applicants selected for participation were given the BSAT (using the pass-fail
cut-score determined in the Preliminary Study),
and then one year later, their supervisors were
asked to rate each employee on a set of 15 performance criteria. As in the Preliminary Study,
researchers examined the correlation between
test scores and performance ratings, trying to
cross-validate the findings from the Preliminary
Study. Thus, both validation studies concern the
predictive validity of the test, that is, whether
the test accurately predicts job performance and
is therefore job-related.

Validity Evidence for the BSAT
What evidence is there concerning the
predictive validity of the BSAT? The primary
validity evidence in the validation studies consists of Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficients relating applicants’ test scores to
supervisors’ performance ratings.
Preliminary Study. Turning first to
Table 2, note that the Preliminary Study reports
no figures for Latinos. Instead, for AfricanAmericans and whites separately and for the
pooled data set, it reports correlations between
BSAT scores and each of the 13 performance
ratings. Note that the BSAT shows a statistically significant correlation with ratings of
overall job performance for the total sample,
r(151)=0.38, p<0.00001. For whites, however,
only 4 of the 13 criterion measures show a statistically significant (p<0.05) relationship with
BSAT score. Indeed, BSAT scores had no significant relationship with ratings of overall job
performance for whites. Averaging across all
correlations for whites (mean r=0.128, p<0.08),
the BSAT predicts about 2% of the variance in
whites’ performance ratings. This represents a
Hedges corrected effect-size of 0.26, equivalent
to an experimental effect in which the treatment
group scores about one-quarter of a standard deviation above the control group.
Also note that, for African-Americans, 7
of the 13 performance ratings (including overall
job performance) show a statistically significant
relationship with BSAT score.
Averaging
across all correlations (mean r=0.314, p<0.006),
the BSAT explains about 10% of the variance in
African-Americans’ performance ratings (Hedges corrected g=0.65). Considered together, this
evidence from the Preliminary Study suggests
that the BSAT is largely invalid for use with
whites, but has marginal validity for use with
African-Americans. We return later to the first
column of Table 2, giving validity coefficients
for the total group.
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Followup Study. Table 3 gives validity
coefficients for the Followup Study. Again the
BSAT shows a significant correlation with ratings of overall job performance for total sample,
r(284)=0.21, p<0.001. For whites, 4 of 15 performance ratings show a significant relationship
with BSAT score: averaging coefficients (mean
r=0.077, p>0.19), the BSAT predicts about 2%
of the variance in whites’ performance ratings
(corrected g=0.19). For African-Americans, 8
of 15 validity coefficients are significant: averaging coefficients (mean r=0.215, p<0.01), the
BSAT predicts about 6% of the variance in African-Americans’ performance ratings (corrected
g=0.44). BSAT score was significantly related
to ratings of overall job performance for both
whites and African-Americans, though these
effect sizes again were relatively small.
The fourth column in Table 3 reports the
only direct empirical evidence available concerning the validity of the BSAT for use in
hiring Latinos. Only one of the 15 validity coefficients was significantly different from zero for
Latinos (r=0.24, p<0.05, one-tailed) for Latinos.
The sole significant coefficient (for coordination) was reported as nonsignificant in the original validation study. Essentially, this means
that the BSAT does no better than chance in
predicting how Latinos will perform on the job
(mean r=0.093, p>0.32, corrected g=0.21).
In relation to the present case, this is the
single most relevant piece of validity evidence
in the entire report. Plainly, these data do not
support the validity of using the BSAT to hire
Latinos.

Table 2: Preliminary Study Correlations
Between BSAT Score and Job Performance
Ratings for Different Groups
---------------------------------------------------------Groups
Total
Job Skills
n=153
------------------------- -------Organizing and
Planning
.28*

White Black
n=94
n=39
-------- --------.09

.34*

.30*

.20*

.27

Decisiveness

.39

*

.25

*

.36*

Oral Communications

.23*

.08

.43*

Written Communications

.28*

.21*

.26

Leadership

.36*

.02

.54*

Interpersonal
Awareness

.25*

.09

.30*

Behavior
Flexibility

.20*

.04

.20

Fact Finding

.38*

.29*

.24

Resistance
to Stress

.21*

.11

.18

Energy
Management

.15

.04

.08

Potential

.42*

.11

.42*

Decision Making

Overall Job
Performance
.38*
.13
.46*
----------------------------------------------------------

Inflation of Apparent Validity Vis-à-Vis
Extensive Analysis: The “Trolling” Problem

Note: Adapted from Tables 4 and 8 of the original validation report.4 An asterisk (*) indicates p<0.05 at the generalized (per-comparison) criterion.5 N for the total sample
is greater than the sum of the ns for the white and black
groups because the Preliminary Study included 16 Hispanics and 4 “other minorities” whose data were pooled
in the analysis of the total sample. Discussed further
ahead in the paper, the “false correlation paradox” (paradoxical confounding) is present when an index for pooled
samples lies outside the range of index values for individual samples considered separately (indicated in red).

It would be one matter if the coefficients
were the only analyses in the validation studies.
If this were the case, then there would be 49
tests of statistical hypotheses in the Preliminary
Study (Table 3) and 60 tests in the Followup
Study (Table 4), for a total of 109 tests.
181

Optimal Data Analysis
2010, Vol. 1, Release 1 (September 17, 2010)

Copyright 2010 by Optimal Data Analysis, LLC
2155-0182/10/$3.00

Table 3: Followup Study Correlations Between BSAT Score
and Job Performance Ratings for Different Groups
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Groups
Total
White
Black
Latino
Job Skills
(n=286)
(n=147)
(n=76)
(n=57)
---------------------------------------------------------------------Organizing and Planning
0.17*
0.08
0.19
0.15
*
*
Decision Making
0.18
-0.12
0.21
-0.08
*
*
Oral Communications
0.17
0.10
0.26
0.01
*
*
*
Written Communications
0.28
0.18
0.44
0.10
*
*
General Administration
0.11
0.09
0.22
0.07
Supervision
0.01
0.02
0.10
0.09
*
*
Coordination
0.19
0.01
0.30
0.24*
Behavior Flexibility
0.10*
0.03
0.20
0.08
*
*
Fact Finding
0.25
0.10
0.33
0.18
*
*
*
Problem Solving
0.22
0.17
0.25
0.08
Resistance to Stress
0.05
0.06
0.05
0.05
*
Ability to Learn and Develop
0.16
0.05
0.17
0.10
*
Tolerance of Ambiguity
0.12
0.08
0.17
0.07
*
*
Management Potential
0.16
0.16
0.08
0.12
*
*
*
Overall Job Performance
0.21
0.14
0.26
0.14
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Adapted from Table 18 of the original validation report .4 N for the total sample is greater than the sum of the ns for
the three subgroups because the Followup Study included six Asians whose data were pooled for total sample analysis. An
asterisk (*) indicates p<0.05 at the generalized (per-comparison) criterion. The coefficient indicated in red was reported as
being nonsignificant in the original validation report, but is actually statistically significant at the generalized criterion
(p<0.05, one-tailed).

I error-rate should be used.5 For example,
among the most commonly employed methods
for reducing the number of “false-positive”
results when conducting numerous statistical
tests is the so-called “Bonferroni adjustment, in
which an adjusted p-value is obtained by dividing the desired alpha-level by the number of pvalues examined. For the BSAT validation
report, a Bonferroni-adjusted p-value would be
roughly .05/1100, or p<0.00005. This is the
cost for undertaking vast numbers of analyses
indiscriminately, when analyses can and should
be more clearly focused.5,6

Tallying across the entire validation
report, however, reveals that more than a thousand statistical tests were performed—all using
the p<0.05 level of statistical significance. Of
those 1000 tests, 50 would be expected simply
by chance alone to be statistically significant at
per-comparison p< 0.05, although exactly which
effects are attributable to chance cannot be
known. The validity evidence is thus inflated,
as the excessive statistical testing adds a substantial number of chance correlations to the
true correlations. Accordingly, well-known procedures for controlling the experimentwise Type
182

Optimal Data Analysis
2010, Vol. 1, Release 1 (September 17, 2010)

Copyright 2010 by Optimal Data Analysis, LLC
2155-0182/10/$3.00

Table 4: Followup Study Means and Standard Deviations for the 15 Job Performance Ratings,
and for BSAT Score for Whites (n=147) and Latinos (n=57)
Whites
Latinos
----------------------------Job Skills
Mean sd
Mean
sd
------------------------------------ ------- ------------ -----Organizing and Planning
5.22 1.13
4.99
1.04
Decision Making
5.15 0.93
4.93
0.84
Oral Communications
5.31 1.15
4.88
1.18
Written Communications
5.24 1.16
4.82
1.23
General Administration
5.12 1.06
4.68
0.87
Supervision
4.98 1.23
4.92
1.32
Coordination
5.39 1.00
4.85 0.90
Behavior Flexibility
5.25 1.17
4.83
1.08
Fact Finding
5.38 1.11
4.88 1.06
Problem Solving
5.18 1.03
4.86
1.10
Resistance to Stress
5.22 1.11
5.25
0.97
Ability to Learn and Develop 5.71 1.01
5.41
1.20
Tolerance of Ambiguity
5.08 1.13
4.81
0.86
Management Potential
6.02 1.93
6.65
2.08
Overall Job Performance
5.35 1.06
5.11
1.08
----------------------------------------------------------------------------BSAT score
218.62 13.89
209.78 15.49
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Adapted from Tables 14 and 17 of the original validation
report.4 Scores on the 7-point rating scales have been reversed
so that high scores reflect better ratings. Means indicated in red
differ from the mean for whites with p<0.05 by Tukey's Honest
Significant Difference multiple range test. These statistically
significant group differences were found when following up significant F-values from initial one-way analyses of variance with
white, Latino, and African-American groups.
In the Melendez case, we took the “middle-ground” approach of adjusting the criterion
to p<0.05 in the validation studies. This reduces
spurious effects (Type I errors), without unduly
increasing false no-difference conclusions (Type
II errors) due to low statistical power. Evaluated at this criterion, there are no significant validity coefficients in the Followup Study.

Illinois Bell defended its inflationary statistical procedures with a statement in the Uniform Guidelines that one should usually use the
p<0.05 level in establishing statistical significance: “...Generally, a selection procedure is
considered related to the criterion, for the purposes of these guidelines, when the relationship
between performance on the procedure and per183
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formance on the criterion measure is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level of significance” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B(5)).
The Uniform Guidelines nonetheless require the
use of “professionally acceptable statistical procedures” in computing validity coefficients
(Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B(5)), and also
caution users to avoid using procedures that
capitalize on chance: “Overstatement of validity
findings. Users should avoid reliance upon
techniques which tend to overestimate validity
findings as a result of capitalization on chance
unless an appropriate safeguard is taken. Reliance upon a few selection procedures or criteria
of successful job performance when many selection procedures or criteria of performance have
been studied, or the use of optimal statistical
weights for selection procedures computed in
one sample, are techniques which tend to inflate
validity estimates as a result of chance. Use of a
large sample is one safeguard; cross-validation
another.” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B.(7).
Clearly, performing 1100 statistical tests
at the p<0.05 level is a procedure that capitalizes on chance. Under the Guidelines, an adjustment to the alpha-level is in order, minimally
one such as using p<0.01. To reduce jury confusion over these technical issues, the Uniform
Guidelines should include specific recommenddations (e.g., Bonferroni adjustments) for reducing Type I error when a large number of statistical tests have been conducted.

have been positive, and half negative. In other
words, if the true value of the correlation in the
population is zero, then there should be just as
many positive validity coefficients as negative.
He noted, however, that 14 of the 15 coefficients for Latinos in the Followup Study were
positive (if not statistically significant). He then
calculated the binomial probability of obtaining
14 positive coefficients and 1 negative, given a
0.50 probability for obtaining either sign (i.e.,
z=3.30, p<0.0005). From this scenario, he
deduced that, despite the complete lack of any
correlation in the AT&T validation study, the
BSAT was nonetheless valid for Latinos—and
at a highly significant p-value!
By pitting one expert’s statistical analysis against the other’s, this form of “junk
science” has great potential to confuse the jury.
To clarify the issue for the layperson, what is
needed is a logical, easy-to-follow explanation
of the difference between the two opposing
views of the same data. However, this is not
always easily developed.
In the Melendez case, we explained the
statistical issue in commonsense terms by using
an archery analogy. Testing the validity of the
BSAT is like an archery contest. An archer fires
15 arrows at a target; to determine his proficiency, we count how many arrows hit the target. Using the BSAT to predict the 15 performance criteria for Latinos, we count how many
times it shows a statistically significant relationship between test score and job performance.
Table 3 shows that for Latinos, all 15 arrows
missed the mark. By the rules of the game, the
archer does not score, and the BSAT is off target (and invalid).
By Illinois Bell’s logic, however, 14 of
the 15 arrows flew in the target’s general direction (i.e., 14 of the 15 validity coefficients were
positive) and only 1 arrow flew in the opposite
direction (i.e., there was only one negative validity coefficient), and so therefore the archer was
a success (and the BSAT is valid for Latinos
because only one of its validity coefficients was

Filling the Validity Gap with Junk Science:
Reinventing Statistics
Through the above evidence, plaintiff
demonstrated that the BSAT had, at most,
negligible validity for white applicants, and no
validity for Latino applicants. And how did
Illinois Bell respond to plaintiff’s showing?
Illinois Bell’s expert witness, an organizational
psychologist, asserted that if the BSAT truly had
a nonsignificant (i.e., zero) statistical relationship with job performance for Latinos, then half
of the validity coefficients for Latinos should
184
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otherwise” (Fed. R. Evid. 702). As interpreted
in the landmark Daubert decision, Rule 702
allows expert testimony when it is both relevant
and scientifically reliable. In Daubert the Court
appointed the trial judge as the “gatekeeper” of
expert testimony, asserting: “[t]his entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to
the facts in issue.” (Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592593). The Court went on to explain: “The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a
flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course,
must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions that they generate”
(Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-595).
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court
held unanimously that a trial court’s decision to
admit or exclude expert evidence should be
accorded great deference (Joiner, 118 S.Ct.
512). Noting that trial judges typically are not
scientists, Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Breyer encouraged judges to take the initiative
to clarify scientific issues (Joiner, 118 S.Ct.
512, 520-521 (Breyer, J., concurring)). They
may, for example, utilize their authority to appoint their own experts, or use pretrial hearings
to explore the issues. The Daubert Court explains that the goal is a middle ground, between
“a ‘free-for-all’ in which befuddled juries are
confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions”, and “a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy” (Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 595-596). The Court recalled the differences
between scientific inquiry and the law, emphasizing that Federal Rules of Evidence are “designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution
of legal disputes” (Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597).

negative). This is fallacious. At issue is the
magnitude of the validity coefficients in the positive direction, not just whether the signs of
these coefficients are positive or negative. For
the BSAT, the magnitudes were insufficient to
establish a statistically significant relationship.
As the Seventh Circuit ruled on appeal, there
was “strong evidence of the BSAT’s inability to
predict job performance,” which supported the
trial court’s finding that “the BSAT’s discriminatory impact was unjustified by Illinois Bell’s
legitimate business needs” (79 F.3d at 669).
That is, the BSAT explains too little variance in
performance ratings to be considered valid for
use in hiring Latinos. If the BSAT does not provide useful, job-related information, then its use
cannot be justified, given the strong evidence of
its adverse impact.
The Admissibility of “Junk Science”
in the Courtroom
Illinois Bell’s spurious defense, that its
test is “valid” because of its positive (though not
statistically significant) correlations with performance ratings, exemplifies the dangers of “junk
science” in the courtroom. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has cautioned: “Expert evidence can be
both powerful and quite misleading because of
the difficulty in evaluating it.” (Daubert, 509
U.S. at 595 (quoting Weinstein, 1992)). Due to
defendant’s discovery abuse, Melendez was able
to bar, altogether, the testimony of the company’s expert witness. More typically, dubious
science is precluded through a ruling by the trial
court that the information is inadmissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Expert testimony is specifically governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which establishes ground rules for admitting expert
testimony: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
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Applying the Uniform Guidelines’ definition of “unfairness” to the BSAT Followup
Study, Latinos had significantly lower BSAT
scores than whites, and passed the test at a significantly lower rate (77% vs. 47% in 1979; 87%
vs. 53% in 1987-88; Table 1). In contrast, on 12
of the 15 performance criteria, Latino and white
performance ratings did not differ significantly
(Table 4). In other words, 80% of the performance measures (including overall job performance) failed to show lower scores for Latinos
than whites. Considered together, this evidence
shows that the BSAT is “unfair” to Latinos
within the meaning of the Uniform Guidelines.

The Concept of Test “Fairness”
Besides adverse impact and validity, another critical concept in judging whether or not
a test in discriminatory is test “fairness.”
Although researchers have suggested numerous
definitional frameworks and statistical models
of test fairness7-12, two approaches are often
used in litigation to define “unfairness,” and to
determine whether a test is “unfair.”
Anne Cleary13 pioneered one of these
definitions at the Educational Testing Service.
According to Cleary’s model, a test is considered “unfair” when it predicts performance differently for different ethnic groups. This differential prediction is detected in the form of statistically significant differences between groups in
the slopes and in the intercepts of the regression
lines relating test scores to performance. Thus,
a test is considered “fair” when there are no significant differences in errors of prediction between groups, using a common regression line.
Ironically, by a strict application of Cleary’s
definition, an invalid test could be deemed
“fair.” It would not be unfair, for example, to
use a coin-flip to hire job applicants, because
this selection procedure does not predict performance better for one ethnic group than for another. It is equally invalid for both groups.
Another definition of “unfairness” prominent in the courts is that used in the Uniform
Guidelines, under which a test is “unfair” when:
“...members of one race, sex, or ethnic group
characteristically obtain lower scores on a selection procedure than members of another group,
and the differences in scores are not reflected in
differences in a measure of job performance...”
(Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B(8)(a)).
In practice, one determines whether a
test is “unfair” by comparing group means on
the test, then looking for comparable mean-differences in group performance ratings. If one
group scores higher on the test, it must also do
better on the job. Stated differently, a test is
“unfair” if it denies job opportunities to a group
whose actual job performance is up to par.

Twisting the Uniform Guidelines
to Establish Test “Fairness”
In a spurious defense of the BSAT, Illinois Bell purported to rely on the Uniform
Guidelines’ definition of test unfairness. At trial
the defense argued that the company adhered to
the letter of the Uniform Guidelines, and advanced two lines of defense based on the Guidelines. Neither the law nor professional standards support these arguments.
What constitutes “a measure of job performance”? On cross-examination, the defense
read to the jury the Uniform Guidelines’ definition of test unfairness in Section 14.B(8)(a), and
then asked:
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Q:

“Am I correct, Doctor, that this says that
the differences in scores are not reflected
in differences in a measure of job
performance? Do you see that, Doctor?”

A:

“Yes, I do.”

Q:

“And you have just testified that here
there are three measures of job
performance at which Whites score
statistically higher than Hispanics, is that
correct Doctor?”

A:

“That’s correct.”
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“So according to this definition which
you have been relying on, there is not
unfairness in this test, isn’t that right,
Doctor?”

In the Melendez case, we reanalyzed the
correlations among the 15 performance ratings
using both exploratory and confirmatory factor
analysis.14 We found that the 15 criteria are
most accurately represented as a single, global
measure of job performance. Statistically, the
15 ratings are sufficiently interrelated so that
they comprise not 15 independent measures, but
rather only one underlying measure. The separate performance ratings cannot properly be considered individually.
Factor analysis should be used routinely
in deciding whether to employ single items or
composite scales to measure job performance.
This would preclude test developers from treating sets of unidimensional criterion measures as
multiple single-item indicators, and then selecting and highlighting, as evidence of test “fairness,” any criteria on which the majority group
has a higher mean. Confirmatory factor analysis, not subjective preference, should answer the
question: “what is a measure?”
Factor analytic methodology adheres to
the Uniform Guidelines, which proscribe “...reliance upon techniques which tend to overestimate validity findings as a result of capitalization on chance.... Reliance upon a few... criteria
of successful job performance when many...
criteria of performance have been studied...
tend[s] to inflate validity estimates as a result of
chance.” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.B(7)).
By what criterion should one judge differences in group means? On cross-examination, the defense inquired where the unfairness
standard in the Uniform Guidelines requires that
group differences be statistically significant.
The Uniform Guidelines do not authorize excursions into chance associations, but the unfairness standard does not explicitly require statistical significance as a decision criterion. It
should be noted, however, that the “Documentation” requirements of the Uniform Guidelines
mandate the reporting of methods of data analysis, as well as the magnitude, direction, and statistical significance of results. It expressly re-

The trial court struck this line of questioning. Illinois Bell’s interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines’ definition of “test unfairness”
lacks any scientific or legal basis. While the
term “measure” may signify either a single item,
or a set of items measuring a single latent construct, this is no mere semantic quibble. What
constitutes a “measure,” in a given context,
must be determined through appropriate legal
and statistical analysis.
As a legal matter, Illinois Bell’s interpretation of Section 14.B(8)(a) ignores its precise
language. Through the use of the phrase “differences in a measure,” the Uniform Guidelines
plainly contemplate “a measure” as comprising
more than one item. This conclusion is reinforced by the language of the definition of “unfairness” in the “Definitions” section of the Uniform Guidelines: “Unfairness of selection procedure. A condition in which members of one
race, sex, or ethnic group characteristically obtain lower scores on a selection procedure than
members of another group, and the differences
are not reflected in differences in measures of
job performance. See section 14.B.(7)” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.16.V) [emphasis added]. The two definitions of “unfairness” must
be read together, and thus do not support reliance on an isolated difference in measurement
(“Definitions” section of the Uniform Guidelines mandates “[t]he following definitions shall
apply throughout these guidelines” (Uniform
Guidelines, §1607.16) [emphasis added]).
Illinois Bell’s argument, moreover,
would permit an employer to ignore the vast
weight of unfavorable evidence, so long as any
favorable evidence existed at all. Defendant’s
interpretation would render the unfairness standard meaningless. The term “measure” cannot be
applied arbitrarily, but requires a fact-sensitive
analysis.
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quires that “[s]tatements regarding the statistical
significance of results should be made (essential).” (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.15.B(8)).
This section of the Guidelines specifically refers
to measures of central tendency (e.g., means)
and studies of test fairness. Illinois Bell argued,
in essence, that professional statistical standards
may somehow be suspended in evaluating employment test data.
Abandoning professional standards is
scientifically and legally untenable. The Uniform Guidelines are themselves founded on the
standards of the psychological profession. The
Uniform Guidelines, §1607.1.C, states: “These
guidelines have been built upon court decisions,
the previously issued guidelines of the agencies,
and the practical experience of the agencies, as
well as the standards of the psychological profession.”
Test developers should always adhere to
professional standards for drawing inferences
from data. The Guidelines do not require researchers to clear the memory of their calculator
between computations, but researchers typically
do so as a matter of course. Nor can employers
ignore the Guidelines’ prohibition against reliance on chance (Uniform Guidelines, §1607.14.
B(7)). And yet, that is precisely the result if one
relies on apparent group differences that lack
statistical significance.

affirmatively establish that the test is “fair.” It
does not prove the positive, that the test is “fair”
and “job related,” but it does disprove one possible negative. The standard, that is, should not
be understood as establishing an affirmative defense for employers. Evidence that a test is not
“unfair” merely forestalls the inference of discrimination that arises in cases when the group
that excels on the test, garnering the greater
share of job opportunities, does not actually do
the job appreciably better. To prove or disprove
“fairness,” the parties may introduce other
evidence.
Ironically, the pattern of data contemplated by the Uniform Guidelines’ unfairness
standard may result in a serious distortion of the
validity evidence. If the data from different ethnic groups are simply (and improperly) combined in a pooled analysis, the distribution of the
data will typically create the illusion of a correlation between test scores and performance ratings. Scatterplotting the data, the group with
higher test scores and performance ratings will
tend to fall in the upper right quadrant of the
scatterplot. The group with lower test scores
and performance ratings will tend to fall in the
lower left quadrant of the scatterplot. This pattern will create an apparent correlation between
test scores and performance ratings, despite the
lack of any true relationship, and it will inflate
obtained validity coefficients for the total sample. This problem is a variation of a phenomenon known as Simpson’s paradox.15,16
The following hypothetical example
demonstrates how the “false correlation” paradox can occur. Imagine that you are in the middle of a job interview. The interview is going
well, so you broach the topic of salary. “How
much would I be paid?” “Well,” replies the interviewer, “take off your shoes, and let’s find
out.” Requesting an explanation, you are told
that the company has found that shoe size is a
valid predictor of a person’s worth. The company routinely measures the size of job applicants’ feet, and then uses the results of that

Illusory “Fairness” and
Artifactual “Validity”
Under the Uniform Guidelines’ “unfairness” standard, if one ethnic group scores higher
than another on an employment test, and this
difference is not reflected in a measure of job
performance, the test is deemed “unfair.” The
BSAT failed this standard. Despite great disparities in test scores, whites and Latinos performed on the job with substantially similar success.
Importantly, under the Uniform Guidelines, the mere fact that majorities outscore minorities on an examination, while securing more
favorable performance evaluations, does not
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measurement to determine salary. Still skeptical, you ask to see the validity evidence, and the

interviewer hands you a copy of a table from a
research document (see Table 5).

TABLE 5: Validating Shoe Size as a Predictor of Salary: Hypothetical Raw Data for Women and Men
Women
-------------Ann
Beatrice
Carol
Diane
Edna
Florence
Gwen
Harriet
Iris
Jacqueline

Occupation
-------------secretary
actress
teacher
librarian
lab technician
baby sitter
journalist
bank teller
nurse
waitress

Shoe Size
-----------3
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
7
7

Mean :
Men
------------Al
Bob
Carl
Don
Ed
Frank
Greg
Harold
Ian
John

5.2

Occupation
-------------salesman
airline pilot
chef
chemist
executive
mechanic
plumber
electrician
detective
architect

Shoe Size
-----------8
8
9
10
10
10
11
11
12
12

Annual Salary
----------------$ 22,000
$ 14,000
$ 30,000
$ 20,000
$ 40,000
$ 10,000
$ 28,000
$ 18,000
$ 32,000
$ 16,000
$ 23,000
Annual Salary
----------------$ 48,000
$ 62,000
$ 50,000
$ 55,000
$ 70,000
$ 40,000
$ 52,000
$ 59,000
$ 45,000
$ 65,000

Mean
10.1
$ 54,600
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Exact Test of Gender Difference:
p<0.000001
p<0.000547
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------This table presents raw (hypothetical)
data for a sample of 10 men and 10 women, listing their first name, occupation, shoe size, and
salary. Reported at the bottom of the data table
are the results of exact nonparametric statistical
analyses5 comparing men’s and women’s mean
shoe-size (predictor) and salary (criterion). Wo-

men have smaller feet than men, and have comparably smaller salaries. Therefore, by the Uniform Guidelines’ unfairness standard, it is not
“unfair” to men or to women to use shoe size to
determine salary. Validity coefficients relating
shoe size to salary, and scatterplots of shoe size
and salary, are presented in Figure 1.
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Men

$60,000
For m en: r = .05, n.s.
$50,000

Salary

$40,000

$30,000

$20,000

$10,000

For w om en: r = .07, n.s.

$0
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Shoe Size
Figure 1: Correlating Shoe Size and Salary using Pooled Hypothetical Raw Data for Women and Men
Examination of validity coefficients for
men and women reveals there is no linear relationship between shoe size and salary for either
group: r=0.05 for men, r=0.07 for women, ps>
0.05. But, if men’s and women’s raw data are
pooled, the men’s data fall into the upper righthand quadrant of the scatterplot, and the
women’s data fall into the lower left-hand quad-

rant (men score higher than women on predictor
and criterion measures). When the correlation
between shoe size and salary is computed for
the total group of 20 subjects, r=0.78, p<0.001)!
Based on this evidence and in accordance with
the Uniform Guidelines, it is concluded that it is
both fair and valid to use shoe size to determine
salary.
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This hypothetical scenario is no more
absurd than the BSAT validation work. In the
Preliminary Study, for example, African-Americans had lower BSAT scores than whites, and
they also had comparably lower performance
ratings (thus the test does not meet the definition
of unfairness, under the Uniform Guidelines’
definition).
Figure 2 displays scatterplots of the
group means on the BSAT and on overall job
performance from the two validity studies.
Clearly, these mean differences will inflate the
apparent linearity of the relationship between
BSAT and performance.
This inflation of correlations strikingly
appears in the table of validity coefficients from
the Preliminary Study (Table 2). Comparing the
correlations of white, African-American, and
total groups on the various performance measures, we find an anomalous pattern.
Consider the performance criterion of
Decision Making. Its validity coefficient is
r=0.20 for the group of 94 whites, and r=0.27
for the group of 39 African-Americans. For the
Total Group, however, the r=0.30 correlation is
higher than that for either subgroup. Similarly,
the validity coefficients for Written Communications are r=0.21 for whites, r=0.26 for African-Americans, and r=0.28 for the Total Group;
for Resistance to Stress, r=0.11 for whites, r=
0.18 for African-Americans, and r=0.21 for the
Total Group; and for Energy, r=0.04 for whites,
r=0.08 for African-Americans, and r=0.15 for
the total group. Cases such as these, in which
the correlations for the pooled group actually
exceed the correlations found in each constituent subgroup, are a tell-tale sign of the “false
correlation paradox,” where in fact the “whole”
is deceptively greater than the sum (or weighted
average) of its parts.16
This technical problem is particularly
critical because Illinois Bell rested its claim that
the test was valid largely based on one number—one validity coefficient: the correlation between BSAT score and the rating of overall job

performance, for the Total Group in the Preliminary Study. That coefficient is r=0.38, significant for the total sample of 153 subjects at p<
0.00001 (see Table 2).
A possible methodology for circumventing such paradoxical confounding (the technical
terminology for the “false-correlation problem”)
is to remove mean differences on the x- and yvariables before combining the data: for example, standardizing the x- and y-scores separately
for each group using a z-score transformation
maps the data into the same metric.16 How does
this work in the shoe size example? After transforming subjects’ raw data to z-scores separately
within the male and female samples, and subjecting these standardized data to correlation
analysis, yields results given in Figure 3. When
properly analyzed, the correlation between shoesize and salary is r=0.05 for men, r=0.07 for
women, and r=0.06 for the total group.
This cure for Simpson’s paradox (normatively standardizing separately by sample) only
works if the true relationship between x and y is
consistent across the multiple samples.16 For
example, if x and y are perfectly positively correlated in sample A and perfectly negatively
correlated in sample B, normatively standardizing the data separately by sample and then
combining them will yield a correlation coefficient of zero. Thus, it is necessary to verify homogeneity of covariance between x and y across
samples before standardizing and pooling the
data.16-18
Fortunately, instances of reverse validity
rarely appear in the personnel selection literature.19 Indeed, some proponents of validity generalization have even argued against the notion
of differential validity altogether, though the
BSAT data clearly show stronger evidence of
validity for African-Americans than for Latinos
or whites.10 Thus, when analyzing the total
sample, it should be routine practice before
pooling data to normatively standardize separately within groups (after first verifying betweengroup equivalence of covariance matrices).
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White (n = 94)
4

African-American (n = 39)
Other (n = 20)
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Average BSAT Score
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Plotting Group Means from Follow up Study
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White (n = 147)

4.00

African-American (n = 76)
Latinos (n = 57)

3.00
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210

215

220

Average BSAT Score

Figure 2: Scatterplotting BSAT score and overall job performance for the Preliminary and Followup
Studies. Supervisors rated overall performance using a 9-point Likert-type scale in the Preliminary
Study (1,2=exceptionally high; 3,4=very high; 5,6=moderately high; 7,8=moderately low; 9=unsatisfactory) and 7-point Likert-type scale in the Followup Study (1=exceptionable; 2=very high; 3=high;
4=average; 5=below average; 6=passable; 7=unacceptable). Scores on these rating scales have been
reversed for ease of presentation.
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Figure 3: Correlating shoe size and salary using hypothetical data normatively standardized separately for women and men
Yet, typically researchers simply pool
data across subgroups in total-sample analyses.
This practice inflates total sample validities
throughout the testing industry. Among the
most robust findings in the literature on cognitive ability testing is that minorities score significantly lower on cognitive ability tests than do
whites.20 And in validation studies, minorities

often receive significantly lower performance
ratings.21 Ironically, if test scores are lower for
minorities than for whites, to meet the Uniform
Guidelines’ unfairness standard, minority performance ratings must also be lower. Although
it is not unfair within the meaning of the
Uniform Guidelines, this very situation will
typically make tests appear more valid than they
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really are, if data are simplistically pooled and
correlated. Test developers should avoid indiscriminately pooling subgroup data, particularly
when these subgroups have different means on
the test and on the criterion.
The Uniform Guidelines provide a basis
for addressing the distortions arising from the
improper pooling of data. Section 1607.14.B
(4), entitled “Representativeness of the sample,”
relevantly provides: Where samples are combined or compared, attention should be given to
see that such samples are comparable in terms
of the actual job they perform, the length of time
on the job where time on the job is likely to
affect performance, and other relevant factors
likely to affect validity differences; or that these
factors are included in the design of the study
and their effects identified (emphasis added).
Hardly restricted to industrial/organizational psychology, this false-correlation problem
pervades the life sciences: indeed it has been
stated that the problem of paradoxical confounding is the most significant and pervasive challenge to the validity of empirical quantitative
analysis in all areas of inquiry.22 The practice of
simply pooling data across subgroups inflates
correlation coefficients whenever one group has
higher mean scores than the other on both x and
y. For example, studies of naturalistic animal
behavior often pool data across intact groups to
examine relationships among social and behavioral variables, without regard to possible mean
differences.23 Similarly, personality psychologists often pool the data of males and females,
examine the correlations among numerous
measures of, for example, anxiety, neuroticism,
and general maladjustment, and find a single,
stable pervasive trait that they label negative
affectivity.24 Given that women tend to report
higher levels of negative experience in general
than do men25, pooling male and female data
without standardization will inflate the observed
intercorrelations for the total group, exaggerateing structural unidimensionality.

The problem of when and how to combine the data of multiple groups remains largely
ignored in the social sciences.16 Haphazardly
pooling data across different groups (or time
periods16) can produce unexpected, counterintuitive relationships, which researchers inevitably
scramble to explain a posteriori. If one group
scores lower than the other on x but higher on y,
for example, then simply pooling the data across
groups can produce a negative correlation for
the total sample, even if the x-y relationship is
actually positive in each group (the group with
lower x scores and higher y scores will fall in
the upper-left quadrant of the scatterplot, whereas the group with higher x scores and lower y
scores will fall in the lower-right quadrant,
yielding a false negative correlation). As a case
in point, when studying psychosocial adjustment
to head injury, researchers often combine the
data of patients who are aware of functional deficits with the data of patients who are unaware
of functional deficits. The correlation between
severity of injury and emotional distress is then
computed. An unexpected negative correlation
often emerges, with greater severity of injury
predictive of less distress.26-28 It seems likely
that the correlation between severity of injury
and distress is actually positive within both the
deficit-aware and deficit-unaware groups (i.e.,
greater severity linked to greater emotional distress), but that patients aware of their impairment have less severe head trauma (lower xscores) and report higher levels of emotional
distress (higher y-scores) than do patients who
are unaware of their impairment, creating a false
negative correlation for the pooled sample.
At first blush, the procedure of standardizing data separately within groups before computing pooled validity coefficients may seem
similar to so-called race norming.29 This latter
practice seeks to ameliorate a test’s adverse impact in personnel selection, by expressing individual test scores in terms of their standing relative to the mean of their particular racial group.
However, the two approaches have entirely
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different objectives. Race-norming uses standardization in deciding which job applicants to
hire. Standardizing raw data separately within
groups before computing pooled validity coefficients, on the other hand, is done simply to
avoid bias in estimating test validity, and is not
used to select job applicants. Whereas race
norming disaggregates data to avoid comparison
between groups when selecting applicants,
standardizing before computing pooled validity
coefficients allows data from different groups to
be meaningfully aggregated when evaluating
test validity if their covariance is homogeneous.

validation studies using total sample correlations have overestimated overall effect strength.
Although most statistical adjustments in
meta-analysis serve to increase the strength of
observed relationships by correcting for sources
of unreliability10, a comparable adjustment is
needed to remove the inflation in correlations
due to paradoxical confounding. If means and
standard deviations are available for racial subgroups from the primary studies, for example,
then group differences can be examined on the
predictor (x) and the criterion (y). When one
group scores higher than others on x or y, a better estimate of the pooled correlation coefficient
is a weighted composite of the correlations for
the separate subgroups, using r-to-z methodology.18 Paradoxical confounding exists whenever the coefficient based on pooled data differs
from the weighted mean coefficient across subgroups.
In the name of validity generalization,
extravagant claims have been made for the efficacy of cognitive ability tests as personnel selection devices. For example, it has been argued:
“[R]eliable measures of the standard aptitudes
(e.g., verbal, quantitative, and spatial abilities)
are valid predictors of... performance on the job
for all jobs in the occupational spectrum...
[T]hese findings can be generalized to all jobs in
the economy for which tests are used in selection... [T]here are no jobs or job families for
which reliable measures of cognitive ability do
not have validity”.31 Couching claims in cosmic
hyperbole, validity generalization is likened to
“the powerful telescopes used in astronomy,”
and it is suggested that the theory is as wellestablished as the measurement of the speed of
light.31
Ironically, persistent disparities between
test scores and performance evaluations of majority and minority employees is also what one
would expect from a pervasive pattern of discrimination. Consistent use of discriminatory
employment tests, coupled with racially-biased
supervisory evaluations, would produce com-

Implications for Validity Generalization
Besides highlighting ambiguities in the
Uniform Guidelines, the Melendez case also has
implications for meta-analytic research on validity generalization.10 This area of research entails synthesizing validity coefficients from
studies attempting to validate personnel selection tests, in order to draw conclusions about the
relationship between cognitive ability and job
performance. Typically, these meta-analyses
have concluded that cognitive ability tests are
generally valid in the workplace across a full
range of different racial subgroups, different
jobs, different tests, and different settings.10
Although conclusions about validity generalization have been criticized on a variety of statistical and conceptual grounds30, the problem of
paradoxical counfounding has been overlooked.
Validity coefficients based on pooled
unstandardized data will be biased whenever the
data contain subsamples that reliably differ on
both the predictor and the criterion (e.g., racial
subgroups, gender, types of jobs, different sites
of data collection). Synthesizing validity coefficients will yield biased conclusions when the
coefficients share a common bias (e.g., whites
had higher test scores and higher performance
ratings than other racial subgroups, and the data
of racial subgroups were simply combined).
This suggests that previous meta-analyses of test
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parable statistical outcomes. For this result to
obtain, overt and conscious racial discrimination
need not exist. For example, unconscious, subjective perceptions favoring majority employees
would tend to inflate the mean criterion measure
for this subgroup; similarly, the impact of broad
societal discrimination would tend to depress
the mean test performance of a minority group.
Where the data for such racial and ethnic groups
are pooled without correcting for differences in
means on predictor and criterion, the likely
result is a distribution yielding false positive
correlations. The resulting evidence of “validity” would be illusory.
The implications for the theory of
validity generalization are clear. Meta-analysis
is based in a vast pool of results from combined
samples, drawn primarily from reported validity
studies of employment tests. A systematic bias
throughout this data base would correspondingly bias the meta-analysis. Further empirical
research is needed to isolate and assess the statistical impact of artifactual validity arising from
paradoxical confounding.

criminatory tests in the workplace may depend
more on their perceived liability costs for the
user than on the specificity of the guidelines for
test development.
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